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Abstract
Labor Laws and Innovation
Can stringent labor laws be e¢ cient? Possibly, if they provide rms with a commitment
device to not punish employees short-run failures and thereby spur the pursuit of value-
maximizing innovative activities. In this paper, we provide empirical evidence that strong
labor laws indeed appear to have an ex ante positive incentive e¤ect by encouraging the
innovative pursuits of rms and their employees. Using patents and citations as proxies
for innovation and a time-varying index of labor laws, we nd that innovation is fostered
by stringent labor laws, especially by laws governing dismissal of employees. We provide
this evidence using levels-on-levels, changes-on-changes, and nally di¤erence-in-di¤erence
regressions that exploit staggered country-level law changes. We also nd that stringent
labor laws disproportionately inuence innovation in the more innovation-intensive sectors
of the economy. Finally, we nd that while the overall e¤ect of stringent labor laws is to
dampen economic growth, laws that govern dismissal of employees are an exception: stringent
laws governing dismissal promote economic growth, consistent with the evidence that they
encourage rm-level innovation.
JEL: F30, G31, J5, J8, K31.
Keywords: Labor laws, R&D, Technological change, Law and nance, Entrepreneurship,
Growth.
1 Introduction
Do legal institutions of an economy a¤ect the pattern of its real investments, and, in
turn, its economic growth? In this paper, we focus on one specic aspect of this overarching
theme: Does the legal framework that governs the relationships between employees and their
employers a¤ect the extent of innovation in an economy?
While the ine¢ ciencies and rigidities associated with stringent labor laws  laws that
prevent employers from seamlessly negotiating and/or terminating labor contracts with em-
ployees  are much celebrated in the academic literature1 and the media, this discussion
is generally centered around the ex post e¤ects of labor laws.2 In particular, it is not di¢ -
cult to see that once the situation to renegotiate or terminate an employment contract has
arisen, tying down an employers hands from doing so can lead to ex post ine¢ cient out-
comes. Much less studied, however, is the ex ante incentive e¤ect of such strong labor laws.
Might stringent labor laws be desirable as they provide rms a commitment device to not
punish short-run failures and thereby spur their employees to undertake activities that are
value-maximizing in the long-run? Indeed, if strong labor laws were always ine¢ cient, their
prevalence in many countries around the world would be hard to justify based on grounds of
economic e¢ ciency, and perhaps could be rationalized only by appealing to political economy
considerations.3 In this paper, we provide empirical evidence that strong labor laws indeed
appear to have an ex ante positive incentive e¤ect by encouraging rms and their employees
to engage in more successful, and more signicant, innovative pursuits.
To provide evidence supporting this ex ante positive e¤ect of labor laws on innovation,
we use data on patents issued by the USPTO to US and foreign rms and citations to
1Botero et al. (2004), for example, claim that heavier regulation of labor leads to adverse consequences
for labor market participation and unemployment.
2For example, strong labor market regulation is often blamed to be one of the reasons for Europes
economic under-performance compared to the US. For a recent study articulating this theme, see the study
of France and Germany by the McKinsey Global Institute (1997).
3Similarly, but for their ex ante e¤ects in encouraging innovative and high-impact research, academic
employment contracts of tenure-track types whereby new hires are awarded an implicit contract of xed
length, subject to minimum interim standards, would be hard to rationalize.
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these patents as constructed by Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg (2001). The industry level
classication we employ pertains to the patent classes in this data. We measure innovation
for an industry in a given year by the number of patents applied for (and subsequently
granted), the number of all subsequent citations to these patents, and the number of rms
ling for patents in that year and industry.
We use the index of labor laws constructed by Deakin et al. (2007). They construct this
index by analyzing in detail the evolution of di¤erences in employment protection legislation
in ve countries  US, UK, France, Germany, and India. They analyze forty dimensions
of labor laws and group them into ve components that correspond to the regulation of:
(i) alternative forms of labor contracting; (ii) working time; (iii) dismissal; (iv) employee
representation; and (v) industrial action.4 This index o¤ers the advantage that it takes into
account not just the formal or positive law but also the self-regulatory mechanisms that
play a functionally similar role to laws in certain countries. While employing the Deakin
et al. index forces us to limit our study to only the ve countries mentioned above, these
countries account for 72% of the patents led with the USPTO during our sample period.
The aggregate measure of the stringency of employment protection used in our paper is the
simple sum of the ve components; higher values represent stricter labor laws, i.e. more
employment protection.5
Employing this data, we test the following hypotheses:
4More specically, the ve sub-indices are as follows: (i) Alternative Employment Contracts measures the
cost to employers of using alternatives to the standardemployment contracts (e.g., part-time employment,
xed-term contracts, agency work). (ii) Regulation of Working Time measures the extent to which the law
protect employeesworking conditions by, for example, stipulating limits to annual leave holiday entitlements
and daily working duration, and compensation for overtime and weekend working. (iii) Regulation of Dis-
missal measures the cost to employers for dismissals incurred through, for example, procedural constraints
on dismissals, remedies for unfair dismissals, and dismissal notication process. (iv) Employee Representa-
tion measures the bargaining power of employees and the ability of employees to co-determine through the
rights to board nomination or through the consultation process. (v) Industrial Action measures the strength
of legal protection for employees engaging in industrial action (among others, strikes and lockouts). Further
detail is provided in the Appendix.
5An alternative to the Deakin et al. (2007) index is the one developed by Botero et al. (2004), which
covers more countries but does not have any time-series variability. Another alternative is the EPL measure
constructed by Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2001) for a set of OECD countries for the years 1990-1998. However,
this index neither o¤ers the cross-sectional comprehensiveness of the index constructed by Botero et al.
(2004), nor the full extent of the longitudinal advantages of the index developed by Deakin et al. (2007).
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Hypothesis 1: Stronger labor laws lead to greater innovation.
Hypothesis 2: Laws governing dismissal of employees inuence innovation more than
other aspects of labor laws.
Since the ex ante incentives of ex post stringent labor laws should matter more in the
innovative sectors of the economy, we also test whether
Hypothesis 3: Stronger labor laws lead to relatively more innovation in the innovation-
intensive industries than in the traditional industries.
Our empirical investigation of these hypotheses proceeds in ve essential steps. First,
to examine the overall e¤ect of labor laws in a country on its innovation, we employ xed
e¤ects regressions of the level of innovation on the level of the labor index, where we include
xed e¤ects for country, industry (i.e. patent class) and application year. In these tests, we
nd that more stringent employment protection positively inuences the innovative activity
in a country. This e¤ect is statistically and economically signicant: an increase in the
labor index by one, ceteris paribus, increases the number of annual patents and subsequent
citations in a patent class by 14:6% and 20:3% respectively.
In estimating this e¤ect, we also control for (i) a countrys creditor rights using the
Djankov et al. (2007) index, its rule of law, e¢ ciency of judicial system, and anti-directors
index as in La Porta et al. (1998); (ii) a countrys bilateral trade with the US in each of its
industries using its exports and imports with the US in di¤erent years, which is necessitated
by our use of US patents to proxy innovation in these countries; (iii) a measure of the
countrys comparative advantage in an industry using the ratio of value-added of an industry
in a country in a given year to the total value-added for the country that year; and (iv) the
GDP per capita of the country.
However, inferring a causal relationship between country level labor laws and innovation
presents the challenge that country level labor laws are expected to be largely correlated with
other country level unobserved factors. Since Deakin et al. trace the evolution of labor laws
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in the ve countries from 1970-2006, their index exhibits substantial time-series variation,
which we exploit in this study. In our second set of tests, therefore, we employ regressions
containing country and application year xed e¤ects to examine the e¤ect of changes in
labor laws in these ve countries on changes in innovation. We nd that in these countries,
changes that make labor laws more stringent increase innovation. By carefully studying
the motivation behind these labor law changes and by examining any reverse causal e¤ects,
we alleviate the concern that the changes in the labor law were e¤ected explicitly to boost
innovation or that other country level changes coinciding with the changes in labor laws were
correlated with changes in innovation.
In our third set of tests, we shed light on our hypothesis that labor laws that a¤ect
the ex-post likelihood of an employee being dismissed from employment matter more for
innovation than other categories of labor laws. We rst line up all the ve components of
the labor index and nd that the regulation of dismissalcomponent is the only one which
has a consistently positive and signicant e¤ect on innovation. Motivated by this nding,
we replace the aggregate labor index with the regulation of dismissalcomponent and nd
its e¤ect to be positive and statistically signicant, implying that tougher dismissal laws are
positively associated with innovation.
Fourth, we exploit the staggered changes in laws governing dismissal in our sample of
countries to conduct di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests. We examine the before-after e¤ect on
innovation of the strengthening of laws governing dismissal in France over the period 1970-
1988 vis-à-vis the US, which did not change any labor laws over the same time period. We
nd that this before-after di¤erence in innovation for French rms was 20% higher over this
time period than the before-after di¤erence over the same time period for the US rms. We
also examine the e¤ects of strengthening of laws governing dismissal in the UK in the 1970s
and in the US in 1989 (in the latter case through the passage of the Worker Adjustment and
Retraining Notication Act (WARN)) and obtain similar results.
Fifth, we investigate inter-industry di¤erences in the e¤ect of labor laws on innovation to
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examine the hypothesis that the e¤ect of labor laws should be disproportionately higher in
industries that exhibit a greater propensity to innovate than in other industries. To conduct
these tests, we follow Acharya and Subramanian (2008) in ranking patent classes by their
patenting intensity in the US. The main coe¢ cient of interest is that on the interaction
of the proxy for patenting intensity with the Labor Law index. In regressions allowing
for xed e¤ects for country, patent class and application year, we nd that the coe¢ cient
on this interaction term is signicantly positive, implying that the e¤ect of labor laws is
disproportionately higher in industries that have a greater propensity to innovate.
Having tested for the positive e¤ect of labor laws on innovation, we inquire what such
an e¤ect implies for country-level economic growth. While the endogenous growth theory
(see Aghion and Howitt (1992)) implies that this positive e¤ect of labor laws on innovation
should translate into a similar positive e¤ect on economic growth, other theories suggest
that stringent labor laws, which grant excessive bargaining power to organized labor, blunt
investment incentives and thereby country-level economic growth (see Stern (2001) for ex-
ample). Indeed, existing empirical evidence nds support for this inimical e¤ect of labor
laws on economic growth (see Besley and Burgess (2004)). Motivated by these conicting
predictions, we examine the e¤ect of labor law changes on growth in real value added for
each ISIC industry in a country. Consistent with the evidence in Besley and Burgess (2004),
we nd after controlling for country, industry, and year xed e¤ects, as well as other country
level variables, that the overall e¤ect of labor laws on economic growth is negative. However,
when we disaggregate the labor laws into their sub-components, we nd that laws governing
dismissal of employees have a large, positive e¤ect on growth in real value added; the other
labor law components have either negative or insignicant e¤ects on economic growth. Us-
ing di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests that exploit changes in dismissal laws in the US, UK, and
France, we nd further support for this positive e¤ect.
Taken together, these tests enable us to conclude that innovation is fostered by stringent
labor laws, especially by laws governing dismissal of employees and in those sectors of the
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economy that are more innovation-intensive. Furthermore, while the overall e¤ect of stringent
labor laws is to dampen economic growth, laws that govern dismissal of employees are an
exception since they encourage economic growth through greater rm-level innovation. In
additional tests, we conrm that the direction of causality runs from labor laws to innovation
and rather than being the other way around; this is also true of the relationship between
laws governing dismissal and growth.
Our evidence provides direct support for the theoretical conclusions of Manso (2008).
Manso considers the optimal compensation scheme that motivates innovation and shows
theoretically that the optimal scheme exhibits substantial tolerance (or even reward) for
failure and reward for long-term success. The intuition of Mansos model ts naturally
with the ex-ante incentive e¤ect of strong labor laws on innovation we document. Innovative
pursuits are likely to be of higher value in the long run but riskier in the short run. If the rm
cannot commit to not re its employees ex post (for example, folding up its R&D units) when
exploration of a new idea turns out to be unsuccessful, then it may nd it too costly ex ante to
encourage innovation. Since innovation is generally perceived to have externalities (Romer,
1986; Grossman and Helpman, 1991; and Aghion and Howitt, 1992), such commitment may
have to take the form of legal protection of employees in their contracts with employers.6
2 Related Literature
Our paper is related to the literature on law and nance, which analyzes the impact of
legal institutions on various aspects of corporate policy and economic outcomes, such as the
nature of external nancing of enterprises (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny,
1997, 1998), the ownership structure of rms (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1999),
6It is worth pointing out that the optimal contract in Manso (2008) that promotes innovation is inherently
time-inconsistent, and thus also naturally explains why strong labor laws would be perceived to be rigid and
ine¢ cient in states where they actually bind. Cremer (1995) makes a similar point but with the somewhat
reverse intuition that in certain settings committing not to punish ex post might conict with the provision
of e¢ cient ex ante incentives. Acharya, John and Sundaram (2000) argue, in a di¤erent context, that a
certain amount of resettingof executive stock options apparently an act of forbearance on part of rms
toward their management may be e¢ cient for continuation outcomes even though it induces moral hazard
ex ante.
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and the mix between market- and bank-dominated nance (Allen and Gale, 2000). Specif-
ically, this paper contributes to the literature that examines the e¤ect of laws that govern
the relationships between employees and their employers. Botero et al. (2004) nd that
heavier regulation of labor leads to adverse consequences for labor market participation and
unemployment and conclude that government interventions in the labor market are driven
primarily by political economic considerations and not by any reasons of e¢ ciency. Atanassov
and Kim (2007) examine the interaction between labor laws and investor protection laws and
nd that rigid employment laws lead to higher likelihood of value-reducing major asset sales,
particularly when investor protection is weak. They nd that assets are sold to forestall lay-
o¤s, even if these asset sales hurt performance. Besley and Burgess (2004) conclude from
their study of manufacturing performance in Indian states that pro-worker labor laws are
associated with lower levels of investment, productivity, and output. In contrast to these
studies which document the negative e¤ects of labor laws, our study nds that stringent
labor laws motivate a rm and its employees to pursue value-enhancing innovative activities.
Directly related to our study is the one by Menezes-Filho and Van Reenen (2003), who
focus on a specic aspect of labor laws  the extent to which unions are allowed to operate
 and survey the existing literature for their e¤ects on innovation. They note that while
U.S. studies nd a negative impact of unions on innovation, European studies do not support
these ndings. Our study pools together ve representative countries that span three di¤erent
legal originsand account for over 70% of patents led in the US. While Menezes-Filho and
Van Reenen (2003) focus on laws governing unions, we examine all dimensions of labor laws
and pay particular attention to laws governing dismissal of employees.
Our work is closely related to the literature on endogenous growth (see Aghion and
Howitt, 1992), which posits that investment in human capital is the central source of technical
progress and an essential ingredient of growth. This theory stresses the need for government
and private sector institutions to nurture competition and innovation and provide incentives
for individuals to be inventive. We contribute to this literature by providing empirical
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evidence that laws that provide ex post job security to employees indeed have a positive
ex-ante e¤ect on innovation and economic growth.
In less directly related work, Simon (1951) and Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975)
argues that stronger labor laws may also have an ex-post e¢ ciency aspect to them. While
the former study argues that strong labor laws provide insurance to employees against risks
associated with loss of income and employment, the latter claims that strong labor laws
reduce transaction costs derived from the incompleteness of the employment contract. While
our study provides direct support to the theoretical conclusions of Manso (2007), the stance
that strong labor laws may be e¢ cient is in line with that in the above studies.
3 Data and Main Proxies
We describe rst our proxies for innovation and the labor law index and the data used
for the same.
To construct proxies for innovation, we use patents led with the US Patent O¢ ce
(USPTO) and the citations to these patents, compiled in the NBER Patents File (Hall,
Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001). The NBER patent dataset provides among other items: an-
nual information on patent assignee names, the number of patents, the number of citations
received by each patent, the technology class of the patent and the year that the patent appli-
cation is led. The dataset covers all patents led with the USPTO by rms from around 85
countries. We exploit the technological dimension of the data generated by patent classes.
Over the years, the USPTO has developed a highly elaborate classication system for the
technologies to which the patented inventions belong, consisting of about 400 patent classes.
During the patent examination process, patents are assigned to detailed technologies as de-
ned by the patent class. The USPTO performs these assignments with care to facilitate
future searches of the prior work in a specic area of technology (Kortum and Lerner, 1999).
We date our patents according to the year in which they were applied for. This avoids
anomalies that may be created due to the lag between the date of application and the date
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of granting of the patent (Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001). Note that although we use
the application year as the relevant year for our analysis, the patents appear in the database
only after they are granted. Hence, we use the patents actually granted (rather than the
patent applications) for our analysis.7
3.1 Proxies for Innovation
We use three broad metrics to measure innovation. The rst is a simple patent count
of the number of patents that were led in a particular year in a specic patent class. As
our second metric of innovative activity, we use the citations that are made to the patents
in a specic patent class. Citations capture the importance and drastic nature of innova-
tion. This proxy is motivated by the recognition that the simple count of patents does
not distinguish breakthrough innovations from less signicant or incremental technological
discoveries.8 Intuitively, the rationale behind using patent citations to identify important
innovations is that if rms are willing to further invest in a project that is building upon a
previous patent, it implies that the cited patent is inuential and economically signicant.
In addition, patent citations tend to arrive over time, suggesting that the importance of a
patent may be revealed over a period of time and may be di¢ cult to evaluate at the time
the innovation occurs. Finally, citations help control for country-level di¤erences arising in
the number of patents due to di¤erences in the number and size of rms.
As our third measure of innovative activity, we employ the number of patenting rms in
a patent class. The USPTO denes assigneeas the entity to which a patent is assigned. A
simple count of the number of assignees in a patent class in a given application year provides
7A caveat about potential biases created by the use of application year, particularly in the case of foreign
patents, is in order. Since foreign rms usually le patents with the domestic patent o¢ ce and then with
the USPTO, readers may believe that the application year recorded with the USPTO does not capture the
exact timing of the innovation. However, the Paris Convention which governs such rms ling both in the
domestic and foreign country, mandates that if the inventor les a foreign patent application in any other
Paris Convention signatory state within 12 months of the domestic ling, overseas patent-granting authorities
will treat the application as if it were led on the rst ling date. Therefore, the application year recorded
with the USPTO would coincide with the application year for the domestic patent of the foreign rm.
8Pakes and Shankerman (1984) show that the distribution of the importance of patents is extremely
skewed, i.e., most of the value is concentrated in a small number of patents. Hall et al. (2005) among others
demonstrate that patent citations are a good measure of the value of innovations.
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a measure of the number of patenting entities.9
Patents have long been used as an indicator of innovative activity in both micro- and
macro-economic studies (Griliches, 1990). Although patents provide an imperfect measure
of innovation, there is no other widely accepted method which can be applied to capture
technological advances.10 Nevertheless, we are aware that using patents has its drawbacks.
Not all rms patent their innovations, because some inventions do not meet the patentability
criteria and because the inventor might rely on secrecy or other means to protect its innova-
tion. In addition, patents measure only successful innovations. To that extent, our results
are subject to the same criticisms as previous studies that use patents to measure innovation
(e.g., Griliches, 1990; Kortum and Lerner, 1999).
3.2 Labor Law index
In order to analyze the impact of labor laws on innovation, we have to rely on an empirical
proxy for the stringency of employment protection. The existing academic literature o¤ers
two main alternatives:
Botero et al. (2004) analyze and code data on employment, collective relations, and social
security laws for 85 countries as of 1997 in order to measure the degree of worker protection.
This index clearly has the advantage that it covers a wide range of countries. However, as
our task is to investigate the causal impact of labor laws on innovation, which necessitates
controlling for observable and unobservable time-varying heterogeneity, we cannot use the
cross-sectional index constructed by Botero et al. (2004) for our di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests.
Deakin et al. (2007) perform a leximetricanalysis, which applies the indexing method
9Since patents may be assigned to individuals, corporations or academic departments, the USPTO classi-
es patents according to the type of assignees using the assignee code. We include assignee codes equal to 2
and 3, which identify US non-government organizations (mostly corporations) and non-US, non-government
organizations (mostly corporations) respectively. These categories account respectively for 47.2% and 31.2%
of all patents led with the USPTO.
10As an alternative to patents, R&D spending across di¤erent industries could be a potential proxy for
innovation intensity. However, in a cross-country setting, this presents several challenges. For example,
accounting norms, particularly whether R&D is capitalized or is expensed, would have a mechanical e¤ect
on R&D spending. Griliches (1990) emphasized that there is a strong relationship in the US between R&D
and the number of patents received at the cross-sectional level, across rms and industries. The median
R-squared is of the order of 0.9.
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to analyze the evolution of di¤erences in employment protection legislation between ve
countries over time. While Deakin et al. (2007) focus their investigation on ve countries
only (US, UK, France, Germany, and India), the advantage of their data is its availability
for the time-span from 1970 to 2006, which allows us to analyze our research question in an
econometrically rigorous way by accounting for various sources of endogeneity. Furthermore,
their sub-division of labor laws into ve sub-components (see footnote 4 and the Appendix)
allows us to trace the impact of labor laws on innovation to a more elementary unit of
analysis, letting us determine what the most important aspect of employment protection
legislation with respect to innovation is. Focussing on ve countries in our analysis does
not represent a substantial omission, as these ve countries account for 72% of patents led
with the USPTO. The aggregate measure of the stringency of employment protection used
in our paper is the simple sum of the ve sub-indices (per country and year); higher values
represent stricter labor laws, i.e. more employment protection.
As Figure 1 shows, the aggregate index of labor laws developed by Deakin et al. (2007)
(hereafter the labor law index) exhibits substantial time-series variation. In addition to its
useful time-series properties, the labor law index also o¤ers a number of other advantages.
While the broad categories used to construct this index largely correspond to similar parts
of the cross-sectional index developed by Botero et al. (2004), Deakin et al. (2007) take
into account not just formal or positive laws, but also self-regulatory mechanisms, including
collective agreements, which play a functionally similar role in certain legal systems; this
feature makes their index more comprehensive than the Botero et al. (2004) index in terms
of the range of rules which are analyzed. In addition, the values reported in their index are
complemented by more detailed country-level data on the evolution of labor laws in each
system. Finally, the components that make up their index are not coded as binary variables,
but can take on several intermediate values.
As mentioned above, the labor law index covers employment law in ve countries over
the time-span 1970-2006. Forty dimensions of labor laws are analyzed, and are grouped into
11
ve aspects of labor and employment law: (i) the regulation of alternative forms of labor
contracting (e.g. self-employment, part-time work, and contract work); (ii) regulation of
working time; (iii) dismissal rules; employee representation; and (v) rules governing industrial
action. By averaging the sub-components for each group per country and year, Deakin et
al. (2007) obtain sub-indices for the ve aspects of labor and employment law.
With regard to our Hypothesis 2 (Stronger laws governing dismissal of employees should
inuence innovation more than other aspects of labor laws.), the sub-index for the Regu-
lation of Dismissalis of particular importance. This sub-index is made up of the following
components: The legally mandated notice period; the amount of mandatory redundancy
compensation; constraints on dismissal imposed by the law (such as dismissal being lawful
only in case of misconduct or serious fault of the employee); parties to be notied in case of
dismissal (this ranges from a formal communication to a state body to a simple oral state-
ment to the employee); redundancy selection (e.g. priority rules based on seniority, marital
status etc.); applicability of priority rules in re-employment; and rules governing unjust dis-
missal (i.e. the extent of procedural constraints on dismissal imposed by the law; whether
reinstatement is the normal remedy for unfair dismissal; the period of service required for
an employee to qualify for protection against unjust dismissal). As Figure 2 shows, the
sub-index for Regulation of dismissal also varies across time.
3.3 Summary Statistics
Table 1 lists the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for the following
variables (by country) for the ve countries in our sample: number of patents led, citations
received by these patents, the number of rms ling patents, as well as the aggregate index
of labor laws, and dismissal laws. Data for the labor law index is available from 1970 to
2006. Since the patent data ends in 2002, we terminate our sample in 2002.
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4 Empirical Results
Our main empirical investigation is aimed at determining whether stronger labor laws lead
to greater innovation. To motivate our empirical tests, we rst show a plot of the aggregate
labor law index against two innovation measures, namely, log of patents and log of citations,
after accounting for year, country, and industry xed e¤ects (see Figure 3). We notice that
there is a clear positive trend between innovation and the stringency of labor laws, which
corroborates the hypothesis that strong labor laws in fact foster innovation. In the following
pages we present statistical evidence that lends further support to this hypothesis.11
Inferring a causal relationship between country-level labor laws and innovation presents
the challenge that country-level labor laws are expected to be largely correlated with other
country-level unobserved factors. However, since the labor law index exhibits substantial
variation in the time-series, we are able to design an empirical strategy to infer the causal
relationship. Our analysis proceeds in several steps. First, to examine the overall e¤ect of
labor laws in a country on its innovation, we employ xed e¤ects regressions of the level of (as
well as changes in) labor laws on the level of (respectively changes in) innovation. Second, to
throw light on our hypothesis that labor laws that a¤ect the ex post likelihood of an employee
being dismissed from employment matter more for innovation than other categories of labor
laws, we examine the e¤ect of one specic component of labor laws  the regulation of
dismissal. In these sets of tests, we conduct xed e¤ect level on levelregressions as well as
di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests, where we examine the before-after e¤ect of a change in the laws
regulating dismissal in the a¤ected country (the treatment group) vis-a-vis the before-after
e¤ect in a country where such a change was not e¤ected (the control group). In our third
set of tests, we investigate inter-industry di¤erences in the e¤ect of labor laws on innovation
to examine the hypothesis that the e¤ect of labor laws should be disproportionately higher
11One concern that should be addressed pre-emptively is that the contracting and legal environments in
India might be very di¤erent from other countries in our sample. To alleviate this concern, as a robustness
check, we also performed all tests detailed on the following pages without observations for India; the results
are almost identical.
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in industries that exhibit a greater propensity to innovate than in other industries. After
examining the e¤ect of labor laws on innovation, we enquire whether this e¤ect translates
into an e¤ect on country level economic growth. Finally, we examine concerns regarding
reverse-causality in the relationship of labor laws to innovation and economic growth.
4.1 Overall E¤ect of Labor Laws
4.1.1 Level regressions
To start with, we regress the levels of our innovation proxies on the level of the labor
index. We employ a xed e¤ects specication where we control for unobserved factors at the
country, time and industry (i.e. patent class) levels:
yict = i + c + t + 1  LaborLawsc;t +  X + "ict (1)
where yict is the natural logarithm of a measure of innovation for the USPTO patent class i
from country c applied for in year t. i; c; t denote respectively patent class, country and
application year xed e¤ects. LaborLawsc;t denotes the stringency of labor laws based on the
index value for country c in year t. X denotes the set of control variables. The application
year xed e¤ects enable us to also control for the problem stemming from the truncation of
citations, i.e., citations to patents applied for in later years would on average be lower than
citations to patents applied for in earlier years. Similarly, the patent class xed e¤ects also
enable us to control for time-invariant di¤erences in patenting and citation practices across
industries. In addition to these xed e¤ects, we employ standard errors that are robust to
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and are clustered at the patent class level.
Table 2 shows the results of the test of equation (1) using the logarithm of the number
of patents, number of patenting rms, and citations to patents as the dependent variables.
In columns 1-3, we rst report the results from our basic test without any control variables.
For each of the three dependent variables, we nd the coe¢ cient on the labor law index to
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be positive and signicant at the 1% level. This result indicates that strong labor laws are
positive correlated with innovation.
Columns 4-9 show results after controlling for other variables that may a¤ect innovation:
Creditor rights Acharya and Subramanian (2008) provide empirical evidence that when
a countrys bankruptcy code is creditor-friendly, excessive liquidations cause levered rms
to shun innovation, whereas by promoting continuation upon failure, a debtor-friendly code
induces greater innovation. Therefore, rst, we control for the extent of creditor protection
in a country using the Djankov et al. (2007) index of creditor rights. We nd the coe¢ cient
on creditor rights to be negative and signicant.
Other laws Since the labor laws in a country may be correlated with its other laws, we
employ the set of (by construction time-invariant) legal variables highlighted by the law and
nance literature (La Porta et al. (1997, 1998)): Rule of Law, Antidirector Rights Index and
the E¢ ciency of Judicial System (all from La Porta et al. (1998)). The rule of law and the
e¢ ciency of the legal system are positively and signicantly correlated with innovation.12
E¤ect of Bilateral Trade While employing patents led with the USPTO to proxy
innovation done in non-US countries avoids heterogeneity from employing patents led under
each countrys individual patenting system, this strategy introduces potential biases. Given
the country, patent class and application year xed e¤ects in our regressions, the coe¢ cient
1 in equation (1) would be biased only if time-varying omitted variables at the country/
patent class level that a¤ect these biases are also correlated with the changes in labor laws.
Nevertheless, we employ non-US countriesbilateral trade with the US as a potential
determinant of the USPTO bias. Countries that export to the US would le more patents
with the USPTO. MacGarvie (2006) nds that citations to a countrys patents are correlated
with the level of exports and imports that the country has with the US. Therefore, in our
12Since the rule of law does not vary over time, we estimate its e¤ect by aggregating the country xed
e¤ects. In omitted tests, we also controlled for legal origin, Logarithm of days to enforce a contract, and
Estimated Cost of Insolvency Proceedings in these regressions. These variables were dropped due to multi-
collinearity. The absence of an e¤ect of legal origin is consistent with the nding in Deakin et al. (2007)
that legal origin has no consistent e¤ect on labor laws.
15
regressions, we add for each country the logarithm of the level of imports and the level of
exports that the country has with the US in each year at each 3-digit ISIC industry level,
using data from Nicita and Olarreaga (2006).13 While imports have no consistent e¤ect,
exports are negatively correlated with innovation, although this e¤ect is only signicant
in columns (6) and (9). Crucially, the e¤ect of labor laws stays positive and statistically
signicant at the 1% level.
E¤ects of a Countrys Industry-Level Comparative Advantage and its Economic
Development A key determinant of innovation is the comparative advantage that a coun-
try possesses in its di¤erent industries, which could a¤ect our interpretation of 1: As our
proxy for industry level comparative advantage, we employ the ratio of value added in a
3-digit ISIC industry in a particular year to the total value added by that country in that
year. The data for these measures come from the United Nations Industrial Development
Organization (UNIDO)s statistics. Relatedly, since richer countries may innovate more and
may also le more patents with the US, we also include the logarithm of real GDP per capita.
We nd in Columns 7-9 of Table 2 that the ratio of value added has no signicant e¤ect
on innovation; this is largely because country level comparative advantages do not change
signicantly over time and our country xed e¤ects absorb any time-invarying e¤ects. No-
tably, in these specications, we nd that the overall e¤ect of labor laws stays positive and
signicant at the 1% level for all three innovation proxies.
Economic magnitudes In addition to being statistically signicant, the economic mag-
nitude of the impact of labor laws on innovative activity is also large. In particular, if we
use Columns 1-3 of Table 2 to estimate these economic magnitudes, we nd that an increase
in the labor index by one would, ceteris paribus, result in a rise in the number of patents
13We match the patent classes to the 3-digit ISIC using a two-step procedure: rst, the updated NBER
patent dataset (patsic02.dta on Brownwyn Halls homepage) assigns each patent to a 2-digit SIC. We then
employed the concordance from 2-digit SIC to 3-digit ISIC codes. Since every patent is already assigned to
a patent class in the original NBER patent dataset, this completes our match from the patent class to the
3-digit ISIC code.
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issued by 14.6%.14 The impact on the number of citations and number of rms is of a similar
order of magnitude. Compared to the economic e¤ects for patents, the e¤ect is larger for the
number of citations and lower for the number of rms: An increase in the labor law index
by one would result in an increase in innovative activity by 12.4% and 20.3% as measured
by the number of patenting rms and citations, respectively.
4.1.2 Change-on-change regressions
Given the xed e¤ects in equation (1), the assumption required to identify 1 is that
time-varying unobserved determinants of innovation at the country and patent class levels
are uncorrelated with the labor law index. However, the labor law index may pick up time-
varying omitted variables at the country level, or industries could be systematically di¤erent
across countries that vary in the labor law index. This may show up as an e¤ect of our
variable of interest, which leads us to our second test where we examine the aggregate e¤ect
of country-level changes in labor laws on changes in innovation:
yict = c + t + 1 LaborLawsc;t +  X + "ict (2)
Since changes in labor laws vary within a country, we include country xed e¤ects to control
for country-specic unobserved factors that may inuence these changes. Further, we include
year xed e¤ects to control for any inter-temporal di¤erences in changes in innovation.
The results of these regressions are displayed in Table 3. Here, we use a similar set of
control variables as in our regressions in Table 2. However, instead of variables measured
at levels, we employ the changes in creditor rights, logarithm of exports and imports, ratio
of value added and the logarithm of GDP per capita. The legal variables (rule of law,
e¢ ciency of the judicial system, anti-director rights) are time-invariant, and hence cannot be
included in their rst di¤erence. Consistent with the ndings in Acharya and Subramanian
14Using Column 1 of Table 2, we nd that ln(Patents) =  2:984 + 0:136  LaborIndex. Therefore, for
example, going from a Labor Law index of 1 to an index value of 2 would result in an increase in the number
of patents led of exp(0:136)  1 = 14:6%.
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(2008), we nd the strengthening of creditor rights to have a negative e¤ect on innovation.
Importantly, the table shows that changes that make labor laws more stringent lead to
increases in innovation, but changes in all the other variables are statistically insignicant.
The assumption required to identify 1 in (2) is that time-varying unobserved determi-
nants of changes in innovation at the country level are uncorrelated with changes in the
labor law index. Since a primary concern in a cross-country study such as ours is the e¤ect
of country level omitted variables on the laws in the country, the above regression employing
changes addresses such endogeneity concerns. A potential concern could still be that the
changes in the labor law were e¤ected with the explicit intention of encouraging innovation
or that the changes in labor law were correlated with country-level factors at that time that
inuence innovation as well. In Section 5, we investigate such reverse causality and residual
endogeneity concerns and argue they were absent in our context.
4.2 E¤ect of Laws Regulating Dismissal
Our next set of tests is designed to shed light on our Hypothesis 2 that labor laws that
a¤ect the ex-post likelihood of an employee being dismissed from employment matter more
for innovation than other categories of labor laws. For this purpose, we exploit the Deakin
et al. (2007) classication of the universe of labor laws in a country into ve di¤erent
categories of laws that a¤ect  (i) alternative employment contracts; (ii) regulation of work
time; (iii) regulation of dismissal; (iv) employee representation; and (v) industrial action.
Laws a¤ecting regulation of dismissalinclude inter alia a legally mandated notice period
for all dismissals, the procedural and substantive constraints on dismissal, and the method
to be employed for notifying the dismissal. For example, would an oral statement notifying
the dismissal su¢ ce or does the employer need to seek the permission of a state body or
third body prior to any individual dismissal or simply notify such authorities? To examine
the relative signicance of the laws regulating dismissal vis-a-vis other categories of laws,
rst, we replace the labor index in equation (1) with the ve components of the labor index.
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Table 4 presents results of the basic tests of equations (1) and (2) where the aggregate
labor index is replaced with its ve sub-indices. Columns 1-3 document the results from the
xed e¤ects regressions of the level of the components of labor laws on the level of innovation,
while Columns 4-6 display the result of these regressions in the rst di¤erences. As can be
seen from Table 4, the only dimension of labor laws which has a consistently positive impact
on innovation is the regulation of dismissal.
This motivates us to focus on the e¤ect of laws regulating dismissal and explore its e¤ect
further. In Table 5, we rerun the regression specications that we employed in Table 2 but
with one change: we replace the aggregate labor index with the regulation of dismissal
component. Importantly, we nd that the coe¢ cient of regulation of dismissalis positive
and statistically signicant in all regression specications, implying that tougher dismissal
laws are associated with greater innovation. The e¤ect of the other covariates is consistent
with our previously documented ndings: As in Table 2, we nd that stronger creditor rights
have a signicantly negative e¤ect on innovation, whereas rule of law, anti-director rights, and
the e¢ ciency of the judicial system are positively correlated with innovation. Imports have
no signicant e¤ect; exports have a negative e¤ect, which, however, is signicant in Columns
(6) and (9) only. The impact of log GDP per capita, and the measure of comparative
advantage (ratio of value added) on innovation is not signicant, just as in Table 2.
The economic impact of the regulation of dismissal on innovative activity is substantial.
Using the results from Column 1 of Table 5, we infer that the strengthening of dismissal
laws as measured by an increase in the dismissal index by one would, other things equal,
result in 17.7% more innovation as measured by the number of patents led. The economic
magnitudes for the other two innovation measures are similar.
4.2.1 Di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests
As in the case of the aggregate labor index, from the above results, we cannot infer a
causal relationship of laws regulating dismissal on innovation due to concerns of time-varying
omitted variables at the country level being correlated with the level of labor laws. In our
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sample, the US, UK and France changed their laws regulating dismissal at di¤erent points in
time (elaborated below). These natural experimentso¤er us the opportunity to estimate
the causal e¤ect of the labor law change through di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the motivation for these di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests; the graphs
show the aggregate labor law indices and dismissal law indices for the ve countries in our
sample over the period from 1970 to 2002. While all other labor law dimensions experienced
changes spread over the entire sample period, laws a¤ecting dismissal underwent changes
primarily in three di¤erent instances: in the UK and France in the early 1970s and in the
US in 1989. To intuitively understand the di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests, consider the e¤ect
on innovation due to the change in laws governing dismissal in the UK in the 1970s. A
naive estimate of the e¤ect of these law changes would be to simply compute the di¤erence
in innovation before (year 1970, for example) and after (1976 and beyond) the labor law
change. However, this estimate would also be a¤ected by time-trends that coincide with
the labor law change as well as other economy wide factors. To control for such factors, we
also estimate this di¤erence in innovation for the US, which did not undergo any change in
labor laws between 1970 and 1988. The di¤erence estimated for the US provides an answer
to the counter-factual question: what would have been the di¤erence in innovation in the
UK if the change in dismissal laws had not occurred?. The di¤erence between these two
di¤erences, therefore, captures the causal e¤ect of the labor law change on innovation. We
repeat these di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests for the other two natural experiments as well:
(i) France versus US for the time period 1970-1988 to investigate the e¤ect of the change
in dismissal laws in France; and (ii) US versus Germany for the time period 1985-2002 to
investigate the e¤ect of the change in dismissal laws in the US.
We implement the di¤erence-in-di¤erence test using the following regression:
yict = i + c + t + 1 Dismissal_lawsc;t + "ict (3)
where y is the natural logarithm of a measure of innovation for the USPTO patent class (i) :
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Country c is either the country that underwent a change in laws governing dismissal (treat-
ment) or a country that did not experience such a change (control). Dismissal_lawsc;t
denotes the index of laws governing dismissal in country c in year t. Thus,Dismissal_lawsc;t
is a constant for the controlgroup. Given the country and year dummies, the coe¢ cient 1
estimates the di¤erence-in-di¤erence. For the test using US versus Germany, 1 estimates
a traditional di¤erence-in-di¤erence since the dismissal law change occurred in the US in
1989.15 For the tests using UK versus US and France versus US, since changes in the laws
governing dismissal occurred in UK and France over the period of a few years, given the
country and year xed e¤ects, the regression (3) estimates the di¤erence-in-di¤erence over
multiple policy changes (see Imbens and Wooldridge 2007, 2008 for di¤erence-in-di¤erence
estimations involving multiple groups and multiple treatments).
Notice that compared to the usual di¤erence-in-di¤erence specication, which contains
dummies for treatment groups and treatment periods only, including dummies for all the
application years as well as the patent classes leads to a much stronger test since we are able
to control for time-invariant country and patent class specic determinants of innovation as
well as time-varying e¤ects that are common to all countries and all patent classes. The
application year xed e¤ects enable us to also control for the problem stemming from the
truncation of citations, i.e., citations to patents applied for in later years would on average
15Since the dismissal law change occured in 1989, denote the before-after time periods by 0 and 1, i.e.
t 2 [1985; 1989] is denoted as 0 and t 2 [1990; 2002] as 1. Since no change in the dismissal law occurred
during the time-period [1985; 2002] for Germany,
E [yi;GER;0] = i + GER + 0 + 1 Dismissal_lawsGER
E [yi;GER;1] = i + GER + 1 + 1 Dismissal_lawsGER
In contrast for the US,
E [yi;US;0] = i + US + 0 + 1 Dismissal_lawsUS;0
E [yi;US;1] = i + US + 1 + 1  (Dismissal_lawsUS;0 +Dismissal_lawsUS)
Since
1   0 = E [yi;GER;1]  E [yi;GER;0]
it follows that
1 Dismissal_lawsUS = fE [yi;US;1]  E [yi;US;0]g   fE [yi;GER;1]  E [yi;GER;0]g
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be lower than citations to patents applied for in earlier years. Similarly, the patent class
xed e¤ects also enable us to control for time-invariant di¤erences in patenting and citation
practices across industries. In addition to these xed e¤ects, our standard errors are robust
to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
Table 6 shows the results of these di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests. Our rst test examines
the impact of dismissal law changes in the UK in the early 1970s; the control group is
the US, which did not experience such a law change in that time interval (see Figure 4).
The results from this test are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 6; the change in dismissal
laws had a positive and signicant impact on two innovation proxies (number of patents
and patenting rms); the impact on the third proxy (patent citations) is also positive, but
not signicant. Our second di¤erence-in-di¤erence test looks at the impact of dismissal law
changes in France in the early 1970s; the control group is again the US (see Figure 5).
Results are reported in columns 4-6 of Table 6 and clearly corroborate the hypothesis that
tougher dismissal laws have a favorable impact on innovation: The coe¢ cient 1, capturing
the causal e¤ect of the dismissal law change in France, is positive and signicant at the 1%
level for all three innovation proxies. The same result obtains in our nal natural experiment,
where we exploit dismissal law changes in the US in 1989; the control groupis Germany,
which did not experience such a law change in the sample period (see Figure 6).
Overall, the evidence presented in Table 6 lends strong support to the hypothesis that
tougher dismissal laws lead ex ante to greater innovation. The economic e¤ects of these law
changes are quite large. In the US, for example, the dismissal index increased from 0 to 0.167
in 1988/1989. The quantitative e¤ect of this strengthening in employment protection was an
increase in innovative activity by 16.1%, as measured by the number of patents.16 The e¤ect
is similar or even larger when the other two innovation proxies are considered; for instance,
using the number of citations to proxy for innovation would imply that the strengthening in
16Using column 7 of Table 6, we nd that ln(Patents) = 4:146 + 0:897  LaborIndex. Therefore, going
from a Labor Law index of 0 to an index value of 0.167 results in an increase in the number of patents led
of exp(0:897  0:167)  1 = exp(0:150)  1 = 16:1%.
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dismissal laws in the U.S. increased innovative activity by 31% per year.
These di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests have several attractive features. First, they are not
subject to the criticism that country or industry level unobserved factors inuencing innova-
tion are correlated with the level of labor laws in a country. This is because these tests exploit
within-country di¤erences before and after the labor law change vis-à-vis similar before-after
di¤erences in countries that did not experience such a change. Second, by examining the
e¤ect of changes in one particular law in one particular country, they provide point estimates
of the e¤ect of specic changes in labor laws on innovation using experiments of greatest
relevance to policies concerned with promoting innovation.
4.3 Inter-industry Di¤erences in the E¤ect of Labor Laws
In our nal set of tests, we investigate inter-industry di¤erences in the e¤ect of labor
laws on innovation to examine our Hypothesis 3 that the e¤ect of labor laws should be
disproportionately stronger in industries that exhibit a greater propensity to innovate than
in other industries. To understand this hypothesis, consider two industries in two countries:
Biotechnology and Textiles in the United Kingdom and France. Firms in the Biotechnology
sector have a higher propensity to innovate than rms in the Textile industry while French
labor laws are on average more employee-friendly than their UK counterpart (see e.g. Botero
et al., 2004; Deakin et al., 2007). According to Manso (2008), incentive contracts that
exhibit tolerance to failure motivate innovation. Therefore, compared to the UK, the e¤ect of
employee-friendly labor laws in France should be disproportionately higher in Biotechnology
than in Textiles.
To test this, we examine the interaction of the time-varying country level index of la-
bor laws with a time-varying, industry-level measure of Innovation Intensity. Again, we
include country, application year, and patent class dummies to control for time-invariant
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heterogeneity at these levels. The regression specication is as follows:
yict = i + c + t + 1  (LaborLawsct  InnovationIntensityi;t 1) (4)
+2  LaborLawsct + 3  InnovationIntensityi;t 1 + X + "ict ;
where InnovationIntensityi;t 1 denotes the Innovation Intensity for patent class i in year
(t  1) :We follow Acharya and Subramanian (2008) in measuring InnovationIntensityi;t 1
as the median number of patents applied for by US rms in patent class i in year (t  1). Since
the proxy for Innovation Intensity is time-varying, it captures the inter-temporal changes in
the propensity to innovate caused by technological shocks. Note that the interaction term
(LaborLawsct  InnovationIntensityi;t 1) exhibits variation at the level of patent class i in
country c in application year t. Since our dependent variable, yict, also varies at the level
of patent class i in country c and application year t, the coe¢ cient 1 is well-identied
and measures the relative e¤ect of labor laws across industries that vary in their innovation
intensity. Note that despite the country xed e¤ects, the coe¢ cient on labor laws (2) is
identied too since the labor law index exhibits variation across time. Similarly, innovation
intensity exhibits time variation as well, and therefore its coe¢ cient (3) can be identied
despite the presence of patent class xed e¤ects.
The principal term of interest is the interaction between country level labor laws and in-
dustry (i.e. patent class) level patenting intensity  LaborLawsctInnovationIntensityi;t 1:
Our hypothesis is that the coe¢ cient 1 > 0, which would imply that the e¤ect of labor laws
is disproportionately higher in industries that have a greater propensity to innovate than in
other industries. As the variable InnovationIntensity is constructed using U.S. patents, we
avoid mechanical correlation of the dependent variable with InnovationIntensity, by using
the innovation proxies based on the number of patenting rms and the number of citations
in this set of tests as the dependent variables.
The results of the basic tests are reported in columns 1-2 of Table 7, where we nd that
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the coe¢ cient of the interaction term is indeed positive and statistically signicant. As in
our previous tests, we control for other determinants of innovation in Columns 3-6. We nd
that the coe¢ cient of the interaction term stays positive and statistically signicant.
The economic magnitude of the e¤ect of the interaction term is also quite signicant.
Using Column 2 in Table 7 with citations as the innovation measure, we nd that
ln(Patents) = 0:054  (LaborIndex)  (InnovationIntensity) +
+0:137  LaborIndex  0:077  InnovationIntensity
Consider now two patent classes which di¤er in the median number of patents issued to US
rms by one; then the marginal e¤ect of labor laws on our proxy for innovation is greater by
39.4% (=0.054/0.137) for the more innovative patent class than the less innovative one.
4.4 Evidence of the E¤ect of Labor Laws on Growth
The endogenous growth theory (see Aghion and Howitt (1992)) posits that rm level
innovation accounts for economic growth at the country level. Given their positive e¤ect on
innovation, do labor laws have a similar positive e¤ect on economic growth?
To investigate this question, we examine how changes in labor laws a¤ect industry level
growth rates in real value added. We start with a log-linear specication for the e¤ect in
levels of labor laws on real-value added:
lnYict = it+ ct+ t + 1  LaborLawsc;t + X + ict (5)
where Yict denotes the real value added in ISIC industry i in country c in year t. t de-
notes year xed e¤ects while it and ct denote a time-trending, industry-specic and time-
trending, country-specic e¤ects that allow for time-varying country-level and industry-level
factors to a¤ect output in a given industry in a given country. To alleviate endogeneity
concerns in the above estimation, we employ the rst-di¤erence transformation on (5) and
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obtain the following specication:
yict = i + c + t + 1 LaborLawsc;t +  X + "ict (6)
where yict = ln YictYic;t 1 denotes the continuously compounded growth in real value added
in ISIC industry i in country c in year t, and t = t   t 1; "ict = ict   ic;t 1: The
dependent variable here is similar to that employed in Rajan and Zingales (1998) (they
use the annualized growth rate rather than the continuously compounded one). 1 here
measures the impact of changes in labor laws on the growth in real value added. The
country xed e¤ects c and i control for country- and industry-specic unobserved factors
a¤ecting growth in real value added while the year-xed e¤ects control for inter-temporal
di¤erences in growth in real value added. Given these xed e¤ects, the assumption required
to identify 1 is that time-varying unobserved determinants of growth in real value added
at the country and industry levels are uncorrelated with the labor law index.
We obtain data on nominal value added from the UNIDO Industrial Statistics database.
We use CPI data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics to deate the value added data in
order to obtain real values; as CPI data for India is not available from the aforementioned
source, we obtain the CPI data for that country from the International Labour Organizations
Labour Statistics database. Our sample extends from 1970-2003.
We display the results of this test in Table 8. In all regressions, we include country
and year xed e¤ects; standard errors are clustered at the industry (ISIC class) level to
account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Several interesting features emerge. Most
importantly, as can be seen from Panel A, columns 1 and 2, the overall impact of stringent
labor laws on growth is signicantly negative. Moreover, the impact of strong creditor rights
on growth is also signicantly negative, which is consistent with the ndings in Acharya and
Subramanian (2008). In the regressions in columns 1 and 2, we control for the logarithm
of the level of imports and the level of exports that a given country has with the US in
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each year at each 3-digit ISIC industry level, in order to account for the e¤ect of bilateral
trade; furthermore, in column 2, we also control for industry level comparative advantage
by including the ratio of value added in a 3-digit ISIC industry in a particular year to the
total value added by that country in that year. Finally, in column 2, we also include the
logarithm of real GDP per capita in order to control for a countrys economic development.
In terms of economic magnitudes, the coe¢ cient estimates in column 1 and 2 indicate that
an increase in the aggregate labor index by one would, ceteris paribus, result in a 2.5%
decrease in output.17
Splitting the Deakin et al. (2007) labor index into its ve sub-components allows us to
paint a more nuanced picture of the impact of labor laws on growth. As can be seen from
column 3 in Panel A, more stringent regulation of dismissal laws has a large positive and
signicant e¤ect on industry level growth rates; the impact of the other labor law components
on growth is insignicant. Quantitatively, the impact of regulation of dismissal on output /
growth is substantial: The coe¢ cient of 0.3 indicates that an increase in the dismissal index
by one, implying a strengthening of dismissal laws, would, ceteris paribus, result in a 7.5%
increase in output.
4.4.1 Di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests
To make further progress on the causal e¤ects of laws governing dismissal on economic
growth, we examine the e¤ects of large dismissal law changes on industry level growth rates
using di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests. In these tests, we use the same dismissal law changes as
described in Section 4.2.1.
The results can be seen in Table 8, Panel B. Our rst test examines the impact of
dismissal law changes in the UK in the early 1970s; the control groupis the US, which did
not experience such a law change in that time interval (see Figure 4); results are reported
17The coe¢ cient on the aggregate labor index is approximately -0.1, which means that a 10% increase in
the index will result in a 1% decrease in output. Similarly, a 25% increase in the index, which implies a one
unit change in the aggregate labor index (which takes on values between 0 and 4), would result in a 2.5%
decrease in output.
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in column 1 of Table 8, Panel B. Our second di¤erence-in-di¤erence test looks at the impact
of dismissal law changes in France in the early 1970s; the control group is again the US
(see Figure 5). Results are reported in column 2 of Table 8, Panel B. In our nal natural
experiment, where we exploit dismissal law changes in the US in 1989, the control group
is Germany, which did not experience such a law change in the sample period (see Figure
6). Results are presented in column 3 of Table 8, Panel B. While the e¤ect of the dismissal
law change in the UK (column 1) on growth is not signicant, the results from the other two
natural experiments indicate that the e¤ect of stringent dismissal laws on growth is indeed
positive and signicant.
In sum, after controlling for country, industry, and year xed e¤ects, as well as other
country level variables, we nd a negative e¤ect of aggregate labor laws on economic growth.
When we disaggregate the labor laws into their sub-components, we nd that stringent reg-
ulation of dismissal laws has a large positive and signicant e¤ect on industry level growth
rates; the impact of the other labor law components on growth is either negative or insigni-
cant. Finally, using dismissal law changes in the US, UK, and France, we document that the
impact of stringent dismissal laws on industry growth is similarly positive and signicant in
two of our three di¤erence-in-di¤erence tests.
5 Discussion
It is important to further examine the direction of causality from labor laws to innovation
and economic growth. Was it the case that labor laws changed for reasons other than
promoting growth and innovation, so that our evidence above can be interpreted truly as
a causal e¤ect of the change on innovation and economic growth? Or, was it the case that
the labor law changes were part of an overall package to promote or give an extra boost to
growth and innovation, so that the evidence above exhibits some reverse causality? Note
that in either of these cases, the evidence lends support to our claim that labor laws can
a¤ect the extent of innovative activity and, in turn, economic growth. Nevertheless, we
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examine reverse causality in our tests below and also discuss the political economy of the
changes in labor laws. Finally, we discuss the relative merits of employing US patents to
proxy innovation internationally.
5.1 Causality or reverse-causality?
If the labor law changes were e¤ected to provide an extra boost to growth and innovation
already occurring due to some other changes in the economy, then we might see an e¤ectof
the change even prior to the change itself. We investigate this e¤ect in our change-on-change
regressions and in our di¤erence-in-di¤erence setting.
5.1.1 Change-on-change regressions
First, we run our change-on-change regressions using lags of the dependent variable:
yic;t l = c + t + 1 LaborLawsc;t +  X + "ict (7)
yic;t l = c + t + 1 DismissalLawsc;t +  X + "ict (8)
where l  1 denotes the number of lags and yic;t l = yic;t l yic;t l 1: Columns 1-5 of Panel
A of Table 9 shows the results of these regressions. In Columns 1-3 (4-6), we observe that
changes in labor laws (dismissal laws) at time t have no statistically signicant e¤ect on our
innovation proxies at time (t  1) : Thus, we infer that changes in aggregate labor laws and
changes in laws governing dismissal do not have an e¤ectprior to the change itself, which
alleviates concerns about reverse causality with respect to our measures of innovation.
In Columns 7-9 of Panel A, we run the regressions (7) and (8) using the continuously
compounded growth in real value added. In Column 7, we nd that changes in aggregate
labor laws at time t have a negative and statistically signicant e¤ect on growth in real
value added at time (t  1) : Motivated by this evidence, we re-run (7) for l = 2 and nd
in Column 8 that changes in aggregate labor laws at time t have no statistically signicant
e¤ect on growth in real value added at time (t  2) : In Column 9, we nd that changes
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in dismissal laws at time t have no statistically signicant e¤ect on growth in real value
added at time (t  1) : Collectively, these tests suggest that while changes in laws governing
dismissal do not precede economic growth, strengthening of other labor laws in general may
occur following an economic recession (perhaps due to political economy e¤ects).
5.1.2 Dynamic e¤ect of changes in dismissal laws
We also examine the dynamic e¤ects of the changes in laws governing dismissal on our
proxies for innovation and on economic growth using the di¤erence-in-di¤erence setting pro-
vided by the change in dismissal laws in the US in 1989. Here, we follow Bertrand and
Mulainathan (2003) in decomposing our change in variable into three separate time periods:
(i) Dismissal Law Change (-2,0), which captures any e¤ects from two years before to the
of the change; (ii) Dismissal Law Change (1,2), which captures the e¤ects in the year after
the change and two years after the change; and (iii) Dismissal Law Change (3), which
captures the e¤ect three years after the change and beyond. Panel B of Table 9 shows the
results of these regressions. A positive and signicant coe¢ cient on Dismissal Law Change
(-2,0) would be symptomatic of reverse causation. However, we nd that while this coe¢ -
cient is negative and statistically signicant in Columns 1-2, it is statistically insignicant in
Columns 3-4. As seen in the coe¢ cients of Dismissal Law Change (1,2) and Dismissal Law
Change (3) in Columns 1-3 of Panel B, we note that while the dismissal law change has
an e¤ect on the innovation proxies in the rst two years,18 the e¤ect of the law change lasts
three years and beyond; in fact, this long-rune¤ect is economically greater than the e¤ect
in the rst two years. These e¤ects are consistent with the long gestation periods involved
with innovative projects. In Column 4 of Panel B, we nd that the positive e¤ects of the
dismissal law change on economic growth manifest in the third year and beyond.
18The e¤ect in the rst two years of the law change is consistent with evidence in Kondo (1999) that there
is about a one-and-a-half year lag between patent applications and R&D investment.
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5.2 Political Economy of Changes in Labor Laws
Botero et al. (2004) nd evidence that labor market regulation is often driven by political
considerations: countries with a longer history of leftist governments have more stringent
labor regulation. The evidence in Deakin et al. (2007) supports the evidence in Botero et al.
(2004) that the primary motivation for labor market (de)regulation is political. Deakin et
al. nd that a rapid decline in the intensity of labor market regulation in the UK coincided
with the election of a Conservative government committed to a policy of labor market dereg-
ulation. Similarly, a limited revival of regulation of the labor markets in the UK coincided
with the return to o¢ ce in 1997 of a Labor government which ended the UKs opting out
of the EU Social Charter. Similarly, they nd that in France, the election of the social-
ist government in 1981 led to a series of labor law reforms, the Auroux laws, which were
enacted in 1982 and a¤ected a wide range of issues in both individual and collective labor
law. Since that time, French labor law has tracked the changing political fortunes of the
main parties. The change in the regulation of dismissal laws in the US was e¤ected in 1989
when the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notication Act of 1988 (WARN) was passed.
Brugemann (2007) examines various articles in the business press that document the events
preceding and following the WARN Act. He does not nd any of these articles arguing that
this Act was aimed at improving any specic aspect of the economy.19
5.3 USPTO Patents as a Proxy for Innovation
To compare innovation done by rms across countries, it is crucial to employ patents
led in a single jurisdiction by rms from these countries. Since enforcement of intellectual
property protection may vary across jurisdictions, comparing domestic patents led in the
various countries would not accurately measure di¤erences in ex-post innovation or the ex-
ante incentives for innovation in these countries. In contrast, comparing patents granted
19Most of the business press articles focus on rms accelerating layo¤s before the laws passage in an e¤ort
to avoid being subject to the new law.
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in one jurisdiction alleviates such concerns of heterogeneity and provides standardization
across patents in the strength of patent protection, the duration of protection, the penalties
for patent infringement and therefore the nature of patent enforcement, and the patenting
practices followed by the jurisdictions patent o¢ ce for all rms ling in the jurisdiction
irrespective of which country the rms belong to.
Given its status as the technological leader, the US is the natural single jurisdiction of
choice. Lall (2003) notes that most researchers on international technological activity use
US patent data, for two reasons. First, practically all innovators who seek to exploit their
technology internationally take out patents in the USA, given its market size and techno-
logical strength. Second, the data are readily available and can be taken to an extremely
detailed level.Furthermore, the US has the most advanced patenting system in the world
(Kortum and Lerner, 1999) and most innovating rms internationally le patents in the US
(Cantwell and Hodson, 1991).20 Finally, US patents are a high quality indicator of interna-
tional technological activity.21
However, using patents led with the USPTO introduces potential biases since it is likely
that foreign rms le patents with the USPTO because they need to sell their products in
the US.22 Hence, the controls we employed in our tests to control for such systematic biases
for comparative advantages and bilateral trade patterns were quite important.
6 Conclusion
We know from the tenure-track system for academic appointments that there is a trade-
o¤ between promoting innovative research by granting faculty a certain period over which
20Cantwell and Hodson (1991) found in their study of patenting practices of the worlds largest rms (from
the Fortune listings) that over 85% of all these rms had recorded patenting in the US.
21Cantwell and Anderson (1996) note that the pattern of patenting in the US is a good indicator of
technological activity in all industrialized and newly industrializing countries. Soete and Wyatt (1983) also
note that although international patenting propensities remain lower than domestic patenting propensities,
international patents are on average of higher quality.
22Paci, Sassu, and Usai (1997) nd that rms apply for a patent abroad mainly to: (i) protect goods to
be exported to the countries concerned; (ii) protect goods that may be subsequently produced in the foreign
country; (iii) guarantee the payment of royalties from the granting of production licences; and (iv) exchange
know-how and other technological information.
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their job is guaranteed and entrenching them for too long. This paper showed that this
relationship between innovation and ease with which employees can be dismissed by rms
exists even in the corporate sector. Using patents and citations as proxies for innovation
and a time-varying index of labor laws, we nd that innovation is fostered by stringent labor
laws, especially by laws governing dismissal of employees.
Why is law necessary? Can rms not write such contracts with employees on their own?
We do not answer this important question. One possibility is that rm-level contracts, if
not enforced by law, lack time-consistency. In this case, the law can provide rms with
a commitment device to not punish short-run failures and thereby to spur the pursuit of
value-maximizing innovative activities. Another possibility is that since innovating rms
do not capture all rents from innovation (the remainder are passed on to consumers and
other rms through externalities), private contracts written to promote innovation can be
improved upon by law by granting employees greater protection. Regardless of the reason
for which stringent labor laws are necessary, our results nd that they are e¤ective: while
stringent labor laws as a whole have a negative impact on economic growth, stringency of
laws governing dismissal has a positive and signicant impact on economic growth.
Overall, we conclude that labor laws are an important part of the policy toolkit for
promoting innovative growth. This conclusion complements the evidence o¤ered by Acharya
and Subramanian (2008) who focus on the e¤ect on innovation of another aspect of the
legal environment the creditor or debtor friendliness of the bankruptcy code. They nd
that debtor-friendly codes, by giving rms a fresh startwhen they falter, promote more
innovative pursuits. It is an interesting, open question as to whether creditor rights and labor
laws interact in their e¤ects, whether they are substitutes or complements, and indeed, which
of the two matters more for innovation.
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Appendix Description of the Labor Law Index
This section briey describes the ve components of the labor law index, as detailed in Deakin,
Lele and Siems (2007), namely Alternative Employment Contracts, Regulation of Working time,
Regulation of Dismissal, Employee Representation, and Industrial Action.
Alternative Employment Contracts. This sub-index measures the cost of using alterna-
tives to the standardemployment contract, computed as an average of eight following variables:
1. Stringency as to the determination of the legal status of the worker (equal 1 if the law mandates
such a status; 0.5 if the law allows the status to be determined by the contract nature; and 0 if the
parties have complete freedom in stipulating the status); 2. Equal treatment of part-time workers
relative to full-time ones (equal 1 if part-time workers are legally recognized a right to equal treat-
ment with full-time workers; 0.5 if this right is more limited; and 0 otherwise); 3. Cost of dismissing
part-time workers relative to that for full-time workers (equal 1 if part-time workers enjoy propor-
tionate rights to full time workers regarding dismissal protection; and 0 otherwise); 4. Substantive
constraints on the conclusion of a xed-term contract (equal 1 if there is such a constraint; and
0 otherwise); 5. The right to equal treatment of xed-term workers relative to permanent workers
(equal 1 if such a right is present, 0.5 if such a right is more limited, and 0 otherwise); 6. Maxi-
mum duration of xed-term contracts before the employment is deemed permanent (taking scores
between 0 and 1, with higher scores indicating a lower allowed duration); 7. Stringency as to the
use of agency work (equal 1 if the use of agency labor is prohibited, 0.5 if this use is limited and
0 otherwise); and 8. Equal treatment of agency workers relative to permanent ones (equal 1 if the
right to this equal treatment is legally recognized, an intermediate score between 0 and 1 if this
right is limited, and 0 otherwise).
Regulation of Working Time. This sub-index measures how employee-focused the law on
working time is. The sub-index is computed as an average score of the following seven variables:
1. Annual leave entitlements, which measures the standardized normal length of annual paid leave
(taking values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating longer leave entitlements); 2. Public
holiday entitlements (taking values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating longer public
holiday entitlements); 3. Overtime premia (equal 1 if the premium if double time, 0.5 if it is time and
a half, and 0 if there is no overtime premium); 4. Weekend working (equal 1 if the normal premium
for weekend working is double time, or if weekend working is prohibited or strictly controlled, 0.5
if it is time and a half, and 0 if there is no premium); 5. Limits to overtime working (equal 1 if
there is a limit to the number of weekly working hours, including overtime, 0.5 if such limits can
be averaged out over a period longer than a week, and 0 if there is no such a limit); 6. Duration of
the weekly normal working hours, exclusive of overtime (equal 1 for 35 hours or less, 0 for 50 hours
or more, and intermediate values between 0 and 1 for the rest); and 7. Maximum daily working
time (scores are normalized to be on a 0-1 scale, with a limit of 8 hours scoring 1, and a limit of
18 hours or more scoring 0).
Regulation of Dismissal. This sub-index measures the extent to which the regulation of
dismissal favors the employee. The sub-index is an average score of the following nine variables:
1. Legally mandated notice period (values are normalized to be between 0 and 1, with 12 weeks
= 1 and 0 weeks = 0); 2. Legally mandated redundancy compensation made to a worker who is
made redundant after 3 years of employment (values are normalized to be between 0 and 1, with
12 weeks = 1 and 0 weeks = 0); 3. Minimum qualifying period of service for normal case of unjust
dismissal (values are normalized to be between 0 and 1, with 0 months = 1 and 3 years or more =
0); 4. Procedural constraints on dismissal (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; the higher of which
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suggests higher costs of the employers failure to follow procedural requirements prior to dismissal);
5. Substantive constraints on dismissal (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; the higher of which
suggests stricter requirements on the part of the employer to establish reasons for dismissal); 6.
Reinstatement as a normal remedy for unfair dismissal (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; which
suggest, as the remedy for unfair dismissal, respectively reinstatement, a choice of reinstatement
or compensation, compensation, no remedy); 7. Notication of dismissal (taking values of 1, 0.67,
0.33 and 0; higher values of which imply more complicated procedure for dismissal notication);
8. Redundancy selection (equal 1 if redundancy dismissal must be based on priority rules, and 0
otherwise); and 9. Priority in re-employment (equal 1 if re-employment must be based on priority
rules, 0 otherwise).
Employee Representation. This sub-index measures the strength of employee representa-
tion. The sub-index is an average score of the following seven variables: 1. Right to Unionization
(taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; higher values indicate better protection of the right to form
trade unions); 2. Right to collective bargaining (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0; higher values
indicate better protection of the right to collective bargaining); 3. Duty to bargain (equal 1 if the
employer has the legal duty to reach an agreement with worker organizations; and 0 otherwise); 4.
Extension of collective agreements (equal 1 if collective agreements are legally extended to third
parties at the national or sectoral level, and 0 otherwise); 5. Closed shops (equal 1 if both pre-entry
and post-entry closed shops are permitted, 0.5 if pre-entry closed shops are prohibited but post-
entry ones are permitted; and 0 if neither type of closed shops is permitted); 6. Codetermination
via board membership (equal 1 if unions/ workers have the legal right to nominate directors in com-
panies of a certain size; and 0 otherwise); and 7. Codetermination and information/ consultation
of workers (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.5, 0.33 and 0; higher values of which suggest higher de-
gree of participation by workers in the determination process through work councils and enterprise
committees).
Industrial Action. This sub-index measures the strength of legal protection for industrial
action. The sub-index is calculated as the average of the following nine variables: 1. Uno¢ cial
industrial action (equal 1 if strikes are conditionally not unlawful, and 0 otherwise); 2. Political
industrial action (equal 1 if political-oriented strikes are permitted, and 0 otherwise); 3. Secondary
industrial action (taking values of 1, 0.5 and 0 if secondary or sympathy strike action is respec-
tively unconstrained, permitted under certain conditions, and prohibited); 4. Lockouts (equal 1
if permitted and 0 otherwise); 5. Right to industrial action (taking values of 1, 0.67, 0.33 and 0;
higher values of which suggest better protection of the right to industrial action); 6. Waiting period
prior to industrial action (equal 1 if strikes can occur without mandatory prior notication/waiting
period, and 0 otherwise); 7. Peace obligation (equal 1 if existence of a collective agreement does
not render a strike unlawful, and 0 otherwise); 8. Compulsory conciliation or arbitration (equal 1
if alternative dispute resolution mechanisms before the strike are not mandatory, and 0 otherwise);
and 9. Replacement of striking workers (equal 1 if employers are prohibited from dismissing striking
workers engaging in a non-violent or non-political strike, and 0 otherwise).
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Figure 1: Aggregate Labor Index.
The aggregate labor indexfor a given country and year is constructed as the sum of ve compo-
nent indices: alternative employment contracts, regulation of working time, regulation of dismissal,
employee representation, and industrial action. Higher values indicate more employment protection
/ stricter labor laws. The index data is from Deakin et al. (2007).
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Figure 2: Regulation of Dismissal.
The gure shows the strength of the Regulation of Dismissalfor a given country and year. Higher
values indicate more employment protection / stricter laws. The index data is from Deakin et al.
(2007).
Figure 3: Innovation Proxies vs. Aggregate Labor Index.
The gure shows a plot of the aggregate labor index against two of the innovation measures we
use in our empirical tests, namely, log of patents and log of citations, after accounting for year,
country, and industry xed e¤ects.
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Figure 4: Regulation of Dismissal, U.S. and U.K.
The gure shows the index representing the regulation of dismissal for the U.S. and U.K. from
1970-1988.
Figure 5: Regulation of Dismissal, U.S. and France.
The gure shows the index representing the regulation of dismissal for the U.S. and France from
1970-1988.
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Figure 6: Regulation of Dismissal, U.S. and Germany.
The gure shows the index representing the regulation of dismissal for the U.S. and Germany from
1970-1995.
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